Introduction: The concept of free will has long been a subject of profound philosophical inquiry, engendering discourse, and contemplation over the centuries. It occupies a pivotal position in our comprehension of human agency, moral responsibility, and the quest for a meaningful existence. This essay delves into the intricate tapestry of debate surrounding the concept of free will, examining the perspectives of determinism, the enigma encapsulated by the “hard problem” of consciousness, the role of randomness, and the computational attributes characterizing the human mind.
Determinism and Causality: Determinism, as a philosophical viewpoint, posits that every event, encompassing human actions, is intrinsically linked to antecedent events through the unerring chain of causality. From this perspective, the precise modeling and prognostication of the cerebral and neural processes would seemingly challenge the existence of free will. This notion finds reinforcement in the observation that the causality underlying many of our actions can be traced back to physical inputs, including cerebral states and external stimuli.
The “Easy Problem” and the “Hard Problem” of Consciousness: To elucidate this perspective, proponents of determinism segregate the dilemma into the “easy problem” and the “hard problem” of consciousness. The “easy problem” is concerned with deciphering the physical mechanisms underpinning our conscious experiences, suggesting that a successful resolution might pave the way for deterministic explanations of human conduct. However, the “hard problem” of consciousness, as delineated by the philosopher David Chalmers, introduces a more profound quandary. This problem revolves around the query as to why and how the physical processes within the human brain give rise to subjective experiences, thereby introducing an element of mystery and insusceptibility to reduction.
Challenges to Determinism: The “hard problem” of consciousness introduces a formidable challenge to the principles of strict determinism, requiring that consciousness and subjective experiences transcend facile reduction to mere physical processes. Furthermore, the arguments posited against determinism offer significant insights into the ongoing debate.
The following essay attempts to summarize prevailing notions of free will and reasons to believe in its absence. This is not meant to be a summary of current philosophical stances on this debate, nor is it meant to be an authority on the subject itself but rather it is meant to over emphasize arguments for and against the issue that stand out in my mind as relevant based on our discussion, in particular, the tone of this essay is meant to be scientific and not philosophical, with issues surrounding the metaphysics of the debate largely left to the readers own research.
1. Weight of Intuition: It is posited that, in the absence of empirical evidence establishing a concrete link between physical processes and human conduct, a measure of importance must be ascribed to the intuitive sentiment of free will that is experienced by all human beings. This underscores the concept that, pending further scientific exploration, one ought to remain ambivalent before conclusive determinations concerning the presence or absence of free will are made. Intuition, while not constituting an unequivocal argument, functions as a reminder of the unfolding progress in our comprehension of complex phenomena. Human intuition does not (in and of itself) run counter to scientific reason, it is the guiding principle against which scientific accuracy is verified. If human intuition does not align with a scientific theory, great care is taken to experimentally verify the theory. Thus, human intuition is a motivating factor, not a limiting element for scientific discovery. Human experience not aligning with scientific theory drives scientific enquiry, decrying the human experience as an illusion to fit scientific theory (which itself might be at a nascent stage) can be counterproductive to furthering scientific enquiry.
2. Complexity of Modeling: This discourse delves into the intricacies involved in modeling systems with a plurality of variables, emphasizing the critical distinction between modeling a solitary variable leading to a definitive outcome and modeling a multitude of variables collectively influencing an outcome. If human behavior can be reduced to modelling inputs and outputs, then it is fair to say that a comprehensive model of human behavior would end the notion of free will. The evidence does exist for this to be true, multiple studies have shown links between physical processes in the human body and behavioral outcomes. Most notably, the case of a man developing a taste for child pornography due to a tumor in the frontal lobe. Arguments against generalizing this can certainly be made, but here we seek to show that even if such a model and such input output mappings can be established, the complexity of such mappings is a non-trivial issue, since one such complex mapping is “free will”. Thus, simply saying there “could be” a complex mapping is not enough, some bounds must be imposed on the mapping for it to be considered a viable and testable scientific theory (indeed if one does not place such a bound of complexity, one runs the risk of indulging in scientism). It is astutely observed that the simplicity of a model is an essential criterion for it to be recognized as a viable theory of the functioning of the world. In practice, models featuring a multitude of variables may render assessments unfeasible, thereby rendering it arduous to confidently pronounce the presence or absence of free will within such systems. For instance, let us say we have a model for whether someone buys apples based on their blood sugar, Apples = 3 * blood sugar + epsilon. Then for sufficiently large numbers of people, we can observe the data (Apples, blood sugar), posit a model, and verify its accuracy. Suppose that this fails, suppose we are unable to create a model for apple purchases, Apple = f(blood sugar) + epsilon. We then can introduce more and more variables, Apples = f(blood sugar, weight, color of the flag of Mexico, …., day of the week), at some point along this journey the problem does not become that of whether one has the right model or the variables, it becomes that of whether the process being modelled can be modelled at all, as the amount of data required to verify this model increases exponentially and the theory might never be tested. Thus, a highly complex model would be indistinguishable from “free will” and indeed the latter might be a simpler explanation than hypothesizing a complex model without experimentally verifying it.
3. Role of Randomness in Subjective Experience: A contrary perspective asserts that subjective experiences might be due to random occurrences amidst the sequence of physical processes, yet this does not intrinsically proffer evidence for the existence of free will. This viewpoint underscores the notion that the mere recognition of randomness does not necessarily imply the existence of free will. In this context, randomness might be construed as a contributing factor in the intricacies of human conduct, sans signifying genuine free will. Here again, we can take recourse to models of human behavior, if Apple = epsilon i.e. the model of apple buying seems to be truly random, then it is also indistinguishable from free will. Thus, randomness of human behavior could certainly be due to a lack of free will or an important empirical consequence of it. It certainly raises the bar for proof of the absence of free will. Any theory of Free Will should necessarily disentangle randomness from Free Will.
4. Computational Nature of the Human Mind: The perspective articulated herein underscores that the essence of free will resides as the most distinguishing feature of the human mind. The contention posits that contemporary computational devices remain bereft of the emergent property of free will, thus demarcating the human mind as distinctive. The counterpoint presented by an opposing viewpoint underscores the core notion that, notwithstanding the intricacies and emergent properties inherent to the human brain, it ultimately finds its basis in physical processes. This reductionist standpoint emphasizes the primacy of physical processes as the fundamental foundation upon which human cognition and conduct are predicated.
6. Distinguishing Worlds with and without Free Will: A thought-provoking analogy is proffered to discriminate between a world with free will and a world bereft of it. In a world governed by free will, human actions assume an unpredictable character, rendering the task of forecasting the movements of individual humans a challenging pursuit for an external observer. This analogy accentuates the complex and unforeseeable nature of human conduct in a world animated by free will and underscores the formidable challenge of disentangling unpredictability from randomness.
7. Free Will and Science: Neither viewpoint, whether it’s the belief in the compatibility of free will with the laws of physics or the belief in their incompatibility, is inherently more “scientific” than the other. The compatibility of free will with the laws of physics is ultimately a philosophical and metaphysical question, and it falls outside the realm of empirical scientific inquiry in the traditional sense.
The scientific method is primarily concerned with empirical observation, experimentation, and the formulation of testable hypotheses. It is well-suited for investigating and understanding the natural world and the physical laws that govern it. However, the question of free will, particularly when it pertains to its compatibility with the laws of physics, involves conceptual and philosophical issues that go beyond empirical observation.
Scientists may conduct experiments to study decision-making processes, brain activity, and related phenomena, but the interpretation of these findings in the context of free will remains a matter of philosophical interpretation. Some scientists may hold philosophical positions on the matter, but those positions are not inherently more scientific simply because of their scientific background.
In summary, the question of free will’s compatibility with the laws of physics is a philosophical and metaphysical inquiry, and it does not fall strictly within the domain of empirical science. Scientific methods can inform this debate by providing insights into decision-making processes and neural activity, but the question itself is inherently philosophical in nature.
Conclusion: In summary, the question of whether free will is a tangible phenomenon remains unresolved. The deterministic perspective, grounded in the principle of causality, offers a compelling viewpoint, suggesting that an in-depth understanding of physical processes may limit human agency. However, the scientific landscape on free will is dynamic and inconclusive.
Recent neuroscience advancements have shed light on the neural processes underpinning decision-making, indicating that actions can be predicted based on neural activity before conscious awareness. This sparks debate on the extent of conscious control over choices, yet it doesn’t provide a definitive answer.
The debate encompasses philosophical, ethical, and psychological aspects, with some arguing that neural underpinnings don’t negate free will if choices align with desires and values.
It is essential to note that while recent advancements in neuroscience may suggest neural pathways for simpler decisions, this doesn’t necessarily apply to more complex decision-making processes. For example, while hunger might correlate with increased spending in a shopping mall, it’s not reasonable to assert that someone’s overall spending patterns can be directly linked to the food they eat. This highlights the intricate nature of human behavior and decision-making, further emphasizing the complexity of the free will debate.
Free will is a multifaceted subject, challenging our understanding of the human experience. It requires sustained scientific and philosophical inquiry to unravel its intricacies. For the most current insights, consult recent scientific literature, recognizing the evolving and interpretive nature of this topic.
